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EGYPT AFTER MUBARAK: THE CHALLENGES AHEAD 
 
 
The events in Egypt in November 2011, and in preceding months, are stark reminders 
that the Middle East is changing in ways which a decade ago were rarely contemplated, 
either in the countries concerned or beyond them. A new solar system is emerging in the 
Arab world in which the gases are still swirling. In time, they will cool and solidify into 
more predictable and hopefully more productive forms—but how long that may take is 
far from certain. 
 
The core argument I presented at Durham University in November 2010 was that the 
coming decade would witness a leadership transition in Egypt whose impact — for better 
or worse — would be felt across the region. The demographic clock was ticking. The 
political, economic, and social outlook was uncertain. And political, economic, social and 
strategic issues were inter-related. 
 
The future of Egypt, and by extension, the Arab Middle East hinged on a conundrum – its 
capacity to change fast enough to meet emerging demographic and other pressures 
depended on empowerment, inclusiveness and growing equalization of opportunity. 
 
However moving in those directions would have existential implications for any Egyptian 
regime. At least in the short term, it would advantage Islamist political and social forces 
more than secular forces, which had sheltered behind the repressive power of secular 
regimes. The process would challenge the existing, secular Arab political order, and the 
predictability of the regional security environment. But the greatest risk to the region was 
the marginalization and growing alienation of its youth if regimes failed to address the 
empowerment issue effectively. 
 
Overall, there was reason to be cautiously optimistic about the capacity of Egypt to 
sustain the momentum of social progress, and to continue with economic reform. I did 
not anticipate political overthrow of the Egyptian regime, believing instead that it had the 
capacity to adapt sufficiently to the requirements of the emerging situation, and to 
achieve further progress in terms of human security and economic development. But two 
cautionary notes were added. If the gaps between Egypt and the globalizing world were 
to be reduced, political reform needed to be part of the process of economic 
transformation. And secular parties had to be more active and effective in seeking to 
capture the political imagination of the emerging Egyptian middle class. 
 
Twelve months on, what can be said about that analysis? 
 
Instead of incremental reform, we saw a sudden political collapse on the part of the old 
regime, and the beginning of a period of political transition whose ultimate direction is 
not yet established. The traditional political class has failed to capture the imagination 
and support of the younger generation of middle class political activists, while 
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‘revolutionists’ have struggled much of the time to sustain popular support for their 
causes in the absence of coherence of vision and effective political and communication 
skills; and amidst the debilitating effects of economic uncertainty on most Egyptians. 
 
Economic insecurity has palpably increased. There has been a rapid growth of the salafist 
phenomenon, adding to increased sectarian tensions, and there are signs of social 
breakdown, ranging from the behavior of football supporters
i
 to the flouting of law by 
street hawkers. 
 
There are nevertheless important elements of continuity to be borne in mind. 
Authoritarianism remains more deeply rooted in Egyptian society and politics than 
liberalism. The popular understanding of democracy in Egypt remains largely associated 
with notions of economic security and social justice, rather than the ability to replace 
leaders through elections.
ii
 
 
The revolution was mostly about political change, not social reform. There remains no 
consensus in Egypt in support of secularism and human rights as social or political 
values. From family, to education systems, to the military and security apparatus, 
Egyptian society remains both chaotic and authoritarian. Resistance continues among the 
Egyptian elite to widening effective political space to the advantage of organizations and 
interests beyond their control. Islamism remains a key challenge to the values by which 
the secular elite attach themselves to a wider cosmopolitan world. Antipathy toward it is 
visceral as well as ideological in many quarters. The Egyptian bureaucracy remains 
highly resistant to change, innovation and procedural transparency. 
 
There is also some degree of continuity, or at least predictability, where the Egyptian 
military is concerned. 
 
The SCAF is not naturally attuned to politics. Increasingly estranged from the popular 
audience since receiving accolades for its part in the removal of Hosny Mubarak from 
power in February, it has proved at times to be politically inept. It is secretive, intolerant 
of criticism, and heavy-handed in its methods: the brutality employed by the military, 
security and police forces during the violent confrontations of late November 2011 was 
reminiscent of the worst moments of the January revolution. At the same time, the 
military leadership displays an aversion to political —as distinct from physical — 
confrontations. Its susceptibility to political pressure remains a matter for speculation, 
with multiple interpretations being advanced of its relationship, in particular, with the 
Muslim Brotherhood. 
 
Perhaps the most serious error of judgment on the part of SCAF to date has been its 
failure to engage effectively with those Egyptian political parties and activists who are 
sceptical, at best, of the military’s commitment to revolutionary change. The introduction 
of draft supra-constitutional principles and other documents that included a secrecy 
clause protecting the military budget from parliamentary oversight was a colossal 
mistake. It helped to restore the flagging momentum of the revolutionists and restored a 
4 | P a g e  
 
degree of coordination among the major elements of the opposition movement beyond 
the Muslim Brotherhood. 
 
In its efforts to shape the political terrain in advance of the hard bargaining which will 
follow the elections it is increasingly clear that the military will not be willing to 
relinquish political control without being certain of its capacity to protect — by whatever 
means necessary — its economic interests and its responsibility for national security. Its 
relations with the Brotherhood, which expects to dominate the election outcomes, have 
suffered accordingly, despite the fact that the Brotherhood shares the military’s 
determination that elections should go ahead. 
 
Whether the SCAF regards the military as the guardian of the secular Egyptian state is 
unclear. But even if the military prefers not to become — and especially in the light of 
the events in Tahrir Square of November, is increasingly unlikely to become — the 
ultimate arbiter of Egyptian politics, it will still have to arrive at a consensus about the 
values which it will want to promote, the interests it will be keenest to preserve, and the 
degree of risk it is prepared to tolerate in the emerging Egypt. 
 
Provided it believes its core interests are safe, the Egyptian military is perhaps more 
likely to prefer inaction than intervention on domestic political and social questions. It is 
unlikely to repeat the Algerian experience when, with the active support of secular 
liberals and Europeans, military intervention against elected Islamists resulted in a civil 
war for the following decade and 150,000 dead. But one can only speculate about the 
inner workings of the military elite, and its level of coherence on political matters. 
 
What is not continuing? 
While remaining adept at coping with bureaucratic and political dysfunction, the base of 
the social and economic pyramid of Egypt is somewhere between anger and despair, 
fuelled by the economic insecurity generated by the revolution. There is genuine 
economic fear and distress among ordinary Egyptians. Cash reserves of many 
individuals, never high to begin with, are exhausted.
iii
 
 
The situation is quite capable of producing —without warning— renewed surges of 
violence driven by economic frustration in urban areas. There is little evidence that the 
political and military elite circles of Egypt understand the depth and volatility of the 
frustration below the surface of urban Egyptian society. Should the situation degenerate 
further in that respect, and if economic conditions continue to deteriorate, the violence 
which would follow would be more destructive than the politically-driven events 
witnessed early in the revolution. 
 
Egypt’s single most urgent need at this stage is to complete its electoral and constitutional 
processes expeditiously. For all the practical and other problems they entail, elections are 
the only basis to bring about political authority which is grounded in an established 
degree of popular support for the competing streams in Egyptian politics. There is little 
indication however that the levels of political authority and economic policy 
predictability that are required will be achieved any time soon. 
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For the moment, the bottom line, and it is one against which contingency planning on the 
part of policy makers would be well advised, is that of a significant risk of further strife 
on the streets of Cairo if the belief takes hold that the military will not effect the handover 
of power to an elected civilian government according to a predetermined timetable. As 
the clashes in November showed, trust in the military has largely and rather suddenly 
collapsed.
iv
 And in the absence of agreement on core issues the legacy of the November 
clashes will be higher levels of popular alienation from the political class, both Islamist 
and secular alike, as well as the military. 
 
It also needs to be borne in mind that despite occasions on which the military and the 
Brotherhood have, for their respective reasons, found it convenient to cooperate, neither 
side has yet made any serious political concessions to the other. Both have differences of 
interest, both material and ideological, which will be difficult to reconcile. The risks of a 
prolonged, highly damaging political stand-off following the elections are real. 
 
The connection between political developments and economic prospects is no less crucial 
for Egypt’s outlook. Any moves that delay the sorting out of new constitutional 
arrangements and informal power sharing deals between the military and the parties 
which emerge successful from the forthcoming elections will be further blows to the 
recovery of the tourism sector — which provides around 3.5 per cent of Egypt’s GDPv — 
and private investment. The economic cost of the revolution has been estimated at around 
$10 billion up to September 2011.
vi
 
 
Strengthening the private sector to achieve social justice through economic growth is a 
key element of the way forward. There is a need to get the liquidity within the banking 
system directed into small and medium enterprises, possibly through the underwriting by 
government of such credit facilities. But the government is not focusing on sectoral 
strategies to bring those outcomes about, and it is seeking instead to finance its budget 
deficits by domestic borrowing at rates which are unsustainably high, and by continuing 
to run down foreign currency reserves.
vii
 
The private sector and foreign investors are waiting for the political situation to stabilize 
and return to a reasonable level of business predictability. Foreign direct investment 
(FDI) dropped from $6.2bn in the 2009/2010 financial year ending in June to $2.1bn in 
2010/2011. The number of new firms registered between January and September 2011 
fell by 15.8 per cent from the same period of 2010.
viii
 Five Cabinet reshuffles in 2011 
have undermined business confidence. 
Economic reformists and advocates for reform policies favouring stronger global and 
regional economic integration and openness (who could at least rely on protection, if not 
political support, under Hosny Mubarak) may not find a champion in the new order. 
Populist suspicions and post-colonial anxieties about foreign interventions and agendas 
remain strong, and have the potential, if left unchecked, to damage prospects for private 
sector-led economic growth, including foreign investment. Among Islamists there is a 
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positive view of business as a general principle, but the actual operations of the 
institutions of the economy and business sector are little understood.
ix
 
 
The regional environment may look more unstable as populist pressures also place strains 
on the normalized relations between Egypt and Israel. Despite the undertakings given to 
Israel and the United States by the Egyptian military and privately by senior figures in the 
Muslim Brotherhood to uphold the Egypt-Israel peace treaty, pressure may build within 
Egypt to match Turkey regarding its rhetoric and, within limits, its behaviour toward 
Israel. To the extent that Islamist parties come to dominate the Egyptian political scene 
and publicly question the legitimacy of the treaty US Congressional and media attitudes 
to the bilateral relationship with Egypt, including the military assistance program, will 
continue to harden. That would generate increasingly negative and defensive responses 
from the Egyptian side. 
 
In short, there is a real risk that within the coming year a combination of political malaise 
and economic insecurity; a standoff between the military and the Muslim Brotherhood 
over the division of authority and responsibility for various functions of government; 
further breakdowns in social order; growing strains in relations between the Egyptian 
military and the United States; and a financial mess and macroeconomic stagnation or 
regression could produce a crisis that an Egyptian government — Islamist or military —
may be unable, or unwilling, to manage. 
 
Islamists 
 
Debate among Egyptian Islamists about involvement in democracy has moved on, mostly 
in favour of such engagement. Islamists are aware that there is some risk to the brand 
through compromise over political issues, or responsibility for economic failure. Some 
prominent salafists are still decidedly lacking in democratic spirit where they address or 
encounter sectarian issues. But these are no longer central issues. The issue on which it 
seems most Islamists now focus is not whether democracy is compatible with Islam and 
vice versa, but how democracy should be used to support Islam and the umma.
x
 
 
That is a deeply problematic area. Electoral success will bring with it the need to debate 
and compromise on basic values. Islamists, from the Muslim Brotherhood to the Gama’a 
Islamiyya and all political viewpoints in between will no longer be able to hide behind 
the role of victim. 
 
If ‘Islam is the solution’, as the rhetoric has long claimed, someone will now have to 
decide what that means in practice—that is, what is meant by Islam, and what is meant by 
solutions. Islamist politicians face the altogether novel, and for some, perhaps, 
uncomfortable prospect of being held accountable for their platforms and their 
performance. 
 
It is not clear, especially given the current values of Egyptian society at large, whether 
liberal ijtihadi views would prevail over neo-traditional Islamist approaches to the so-
called grey zones of policy
xi—including women and minorities— and the responsibility 
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(indeed for some, the obligation) of governments to use the power of the state to foster a 
stronger Muslim society.
xii
 The Islamist approach to regional security issues is also far 
from clear. 
 
Egypt is not Tunisia, or Turkey. A key unknown of the elections is the extent to which 
salafist elements may emerge to challenge the political pretentions of the Moslem 
Brotherhood. But especially in the coming 2-4 years, or at least until the next electoral 
cycle, empowerment at political but not social levels means the odds favour neo-
traditional Islamists associated with the Brotherhood, or the small salafist parties and 
preachers. 
 
Pessimists may argue that the mobilizational capability of traditionalists and salafists 
favouring literalist and puritanical approaches to matters of religion and politics are 
bound to outweigh the more inclusive approaches of liberal Islamist reformists who 
mostly focus on the principles of Islam.
xiii
 The electoral successes of the Turkish AKP 
(Freedom and Justice Party) also indicate that, over time, Islamist reformists can operate 
better (if necessary) under a secular constitution than their secular political counterparts. 
 
But socio-economic drivers of change are irreversible; and the neo-traditionalists and 
salafists probably have no better answers in the emerging context than their more 
pragmatic rivals. Generational change, education, women’s empowerment and the 
seductive power of the Internet will shape values in favour of some form of Arab/Islamic 
modernity over time—especially if pietists do not succeed in entrenching themselves 
politically. 
 
The slope of the political and social terrain in the longer term outlook favours the 
Islamist reformists, rather than their neo-traditionalist and salafist rivals. In future, they 
will probably be increasingly inclined to build common ground with their secular 
counterparts and vice versa—although that process has barely begun to develop. 
 
If that analysis is broadly correct, then the key issue at this stage is not so much the 
political character, but rather the constitutional basis of the emerging government. In 
particular, how do Egyptians expand the (secular) space within which values can be 
debated; and how can such debates and the values arising from them be seen as part of 
organic processes of change, not as external implants into those processes? 
 
While in western contexts freedom of political debate may be sufficient to protect rights, 
in the contemporary and emerging Egyptian context a more robust and carefully 
articulated set of constitutional provisions is probably required. In an environment certain 
to be dominated by populist politics and a degree of xenophobia towards the West and its 
perceived values, a great deal hinges on what guarantees will be available to ensure 
respect for the rights of those secular Muslims who the salafists and neo-traditionalists 
regard as an affront to their concept of Islamic orthodoxy. Provision also needs to be 
made for the protection of the rights of Coptic Christians and other minority groups such 
as the Bahais and the Shia. 
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Outlook 
 
The coming year will see multiple contests between the military and Islamists over the 
respective roles and responsibilities of executive and parliament domains. The most 
likely result will be an informal preservation of military’s key interests, in return for an 
enhanced level of Islamist influence over social policy. At the same time societal, 
political and economic divisions, including divisions relating to access to opportunity and 
the preservation of privilege will continue to widen. 
 
Consensus within Egyptian society on the question of national values is unlikely, but a 
clear delineation of power and authority is probably a higher priority need. It would be 
deeply unfortunate if the end result of the elections and post-election bargaining were a 
government which lacked both authority and political accountability, because its 
decisions were subject to review by the military. 
 
Looking further ahead, the key ingredients of a successful transition will be the 
institutions and processes it embodies, including constitutional arrangements, civil 
society and media freedoms, rather than short term electoral outcomes. The age of the 
‘Arab hero’ immune from public criticism is over. Ideology will ultimately be less 
important in shaping the prospects for reform in Egypt than demography, education, and 
demands to be modern within an Arab identity; and the degree to which empowerment, 
inclusiveness and respect for constitutionality emerge or survive as genuinely held 
values. 
 
Five years from now the situation may look more settled and promising, as new 
institutions mature and the reformists, having acquired new levels of political experience, 
regain momentum. But whether the values associated with reform apply or not, the social 
and economic drivers of change are inescapable. 
 
An Egyptian born in 2000 among 65 m people will be living among 130m by 2050
xiv
, 
with less water (perhaps 60% less flow in the Nile) and less arable land.
xv
 Pressure will 
build to find sustainable economic and social alternatives as the basis for social progress. 
A situation where, in 2007, one square metre of land in newly-constructed gated suburbs 
on the outskirts of Cairo was selling for more than annual income of 40% of Egyptians
xvi
 
is simply unsustainable. 
 
We should not overlook the progress that has been made in reducing levels of absolute 
poverty, illiteracy and average ages of males on marriage.
xvii
 However there are major 
structural challenges. Egyptians with post- secondary education comprise 42 per cent of 
the Egyptian labour force but 80% of the unemployed.
xviii
 Consumption subsidies (which 
have averaged 8% of GDP over the past four years) are unsustainable without strong 
economic growth. Internet usage in Egypt rose from less than one per cent to almost 25% 
in the period from 2000 to 2011, but Egypt still had a broadband penetration rate of under 
1% at the end of 2008.
xix
 Egypt spends a mere 0.02% of GDP on research and 
development, compared to a developing country average of 1%.
xx
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Only a strong, confident, innovative, globally-connected and competitive Egyptian 
private sector, backed by a government which enjoys a considerable measure of popular 
authority and respect, and which has the strong support of the international financial and 
political community, can deliver the outcomes that Egyptians need. And if progress is to 
be sustainable, the driving force of the private sector has to be accompanied by political 
reform and harnessed to a more effective income redistribution mechanism. 
 
Conclusion 
 
At this moment the shadow of the future hangs rather ominously over Egypt. But we are 
seeing a process which may lay the foundations for a different, and when it comes to 
government, a more accountable sort of Arab society. Its success or failure will influence 
much of the wider Arab world. 
 
When they look back a decade hence, Egyptians will probably conclude that for all its 
problems, the operation was necessary. The old order did not change fast enough to meet 
the demands of the new generation of Egyptians that was better educated and nourished, 
more technologically adept and vastly more politically sophisticated than before. 
 
If the patient should die, we will all be the poorer. But it is incorrect to argue that the 
revolution was either premature or ill-conceived. 
 
The capacity to make further progress in terms of human security and economic 
development will improve over the coming decade, if Egypt’s elected political leadership 
is effective. It will degrade if Egypt’s political leadership fails. 
 
The state will continue to mediate between Egyptian Arab society and world society. It 
will seek to preserve privilege, by adaptation and cooptation of reform where necessary. 
But over the coming decade the decline of the primacy of the state in the economic life of 
Egyptians is likely to continue, while opportunities as well as risks for individuals will 
expand. 
 
In the short term we should expect a period of instability and democratic deficit. Some 
populist approaches will have to be tested before being set aside in favour of more 
pragmatic policies. But over the coming decade the empowerment of individuals may 
increasingly shape the political environment to the benefit of the centrist part of the 
spectrum. 
 
The initial excitement and optimism of the Arab uprisings will become a distant memory 
for many Egyptians, but demands for popular empowerment and government 
accountability will continue to be drawn upon by the current generation of political 
activists and those that will follow. 
 
What approach should external parties take? My presentation in 2010 made three 
interconnected points on that score. First, Egypt reminded us to beware of academics and 
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commentators blundering around in highly contested political, economic and social 
space. Second, for a wide range of cultural and historical reasons, the resilience of 
Egyptian state and society in response to unwelcome and unsolicited external pressure 
went to the core of what it meant—at least to most decision-makers—to be Arab and 
Egyptian. Third, for Egypt’s political culture to change, and for political reform to be 
durable, the core values of Egyptian society would have to be rebooted by Egyptians 
themselves. 
 
Those remain my views. I would add that amidst the complexity and uncertainty which 
surrounds the outlook for Egypt, and the inevitable calls in some quarters to welcome 
promises of stability, however illusory, at the expense of empowerment, we should 
remember that authoritarian rule in Egypt became fundamentally damaging to social 
progress. It served ultimately to highlight the connection between political dysfunction 
and the problems of achieving human development. 
 
It is also appropriate to remember that the part played by the United States, the EU, 
Australia and other western countries in support of popular demands; and in regard to 
Palestine and other major political issues, and in regard to capacity building in Egypt, 
will continue to shape the political culture not only of Egypt, but of the Middle East as a 
whole. 
 
There will be moments of intransigence and recidivism among political actors and 
regimes, including in Egypt, in the years ahead, despite the optimism initially generated 
by the Arab uprisings. But we cannot resign ourselves meekly to accepting uncritically 
arguments of Arab exceptionalism from those quarters, nor can we delude ourselves into 
believing that external pressure for reform can be productive. Both approaches on our 
part, if adopted, would risk engendering perceptions that the West and its values are 
largely irrelevant to the region’s future. 
 
For sound reasons of national interest, the battle of values is there to be won, not 
abandoned. 
 
We have to stay engaged in the processes and events unfolding in Egypt and elsewhere, 
as best we can, where our assistance is sought. Recognizing that successful transitions 
will have to be internally-driven, credible and effective civil society organizations must 
be expected to rely largely on domestically-raised finance. Seed funding aside, the 
insertion of external support into Egypt’s reform processes is fraught with risk of 
changing the perceived character and intent of those measures. Direct support to civil 
society organizations almost always backfires, for both the donor and the recipient, when 
it intended to affect political and security issues. 
 
There are certain areas however where outsiders may have comparative advantage and 
experience in capacity building which may be useful to those who advocate reform from 
within those societies. Scholarships, support for research and development capacity-
building, and sharing of lessons learnt may provide indirect support to progressive ideas 
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—especially among the young and among the business sector. They are potentially 
valuable ways forward for all sides. 
 
It is important for outsiders to reaffirm the positives in the regional outlook at a time 
when optimism is under some pressure. It is a matter of buckling down to the hard work 
of judging where interests may be shared, and working to widen that arena, and doing 
what we can to hold the line regarding our own values and interests while the region 
recalibrates itself over the next few years. 
 
There is reason to be concerned at the short-term outlook, especially in Egypt and Syria, 
and the prospects of counter-revolutionary forces mobilizing in defence of the privileges 
and values of the authoritarian order. The dinosaurs may be on the defensive, but they 
remain dangerous. But we should remain modestly optimistic that five years from now 
the regional outlook overall will be somewhat better than it is today. Not every country 
will rise up, but every country will be changed. The Arab world will never be the same 
again. 
 
In three to five years Arab political audiences in Egypt and beyond will be drawing their 
own conclusions about whether their rulers — be they monarchs, republican presidents or 
military —are merely temporizing and therefore part of the problems those citizens face, 
or genuine about reform and therefore part of the solutions. Assessments of leadership 
credibility, together with national economic performance, will have far-reaching political 
consequences. 
 
In the meantime there is nothing to be gained — and some useful opportunities will be 
lost — if we are mainly preoccupied with beating our breasts over changes largely 
beyond our control. For the most part we should refrain from offering unsolicited advice, 
and let our policies and principles speak for themselves. Our primary goal should be to 
add value to the efforts of Egyptians to build their own futures. 
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